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Reply to Kasperski, Kuchinskaya and Josephson on "J-value assessment of 
relocation measures following the nuclear power plant accidents at Chernobyl 
and Fukushima Daiichi" by I. Waddington, P. J. Thomas, R. H. Taylor, and G. 
J. Vaughan 
 We thank Kasperski et al. for their interest in the "Relocation Paper" of 
Waddington et al. (2017) and for voicing concerns that may well have been at the 
back of many people's minds before the NREFS Special Issue was published.   
 Kasperski et al. (xxxx) argue in favour of a universal policy of relocation after 
a big nuclear reactor accident even where the risk posed to the public by the 
radioactive fallout is small, saying: 
"The point is that there will always be a degree of uncertainty that should lead to 
such precautionary measures as evacuation even if it turns out that risk was 
exaggerated." 
Hence Kasperski et al. disagree with the use of the J-value in the "Relocation Paper" 
of Waddington et al. (2017), which suggests that the relocation of fewer than a quarter 
of the 335,000 people actually moved away permanently (or "relocated") could be 
justified after the Chernobyl accident.  Meanwhile the J-value recommended that the 
160,000 people moved away after the accident at Fukushima Daiichi ought to have 
been allowed to remain in their homes, given the Japanese Government's 20 mSv per 
year safe return dose. 
 Their argument against the J-value turns out to be part of their more general 
philosophy, as Kasperski et al. believe that it is not possible to apply quantitative 
methods as a guide to human behaviour: 
"The use of the quantitative methodologies of necessity ignores issues that 
cannot be quantified"  
and 
"To put it simply, technological tools to consider technical costs, benefits and 
risks, exclude the human factor." 
We have a degree of sympathy with this position, to the limited extent that we concur 
that modelling human behaviour is indeed a difficult task.  For example, two of the 
authors of the Relocation Paper have been highly critical previously, in the pages of 
this journal, of attempts to quantify the "value of a human life (VPF)" in the UK, 
showing that the approach employed was so flawed as to lose any validity (Thomas 
and Vaughan, 2015).  See also (Thomas and Vaughan, 2014).  However, to reject all 
technological tools would be to reject such useful mathematical constructs as game 
theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) and, indeed most, if not all, of 
economics, as well as the J-value.  We have to disagree with this stance. 
 Before the J-value was devised, techniques existed to estimate the probability 
of an accident happening in the nuclear industry and others, as well as the number of 
people likely to killed if it did.  The Reactor Safety Study (US NRC, 1975) constitutes 
an early example.  It was even possible, in a more sophisticated approach, to calculate 
the loss of life expectancy in the population under threat after a big nuclear accident 
(Marshall et al., 1983).  But given a non-zero probability of serious harm, the question 
remained: how does one judge how much ought to be spent to reduce the likelihood 
further?  Stopping all activities involving any degree of risk is ruled out by the fact 
that there is a level of risk associated with everything we do.  Living is an inherently 
risky business, whether one ventures out and braves being knocked down by a car or 
stays inside one's house to face a multitude of domestic hazards (electrocution, falling 
down the stairs, death from fire and so on).  Clearly less should be spent to counter a 
low risk and more for a high risk, but how does one decide how much?  A 
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comparative approach was often taken in the past, but this was open to the significant 
problem that, historically, very different sums of money have been devoted to 
averting similar levels of harm (Tengs et al., 1995).   Cost-benefit analysis applied to 
situations involving the possible curtailment of life relied in the UK, at least, on a 
VPF figure dependent on only a small number of opinions assembled within an 
invalid framework for interpretation, as noted above.   
 The J-value method (Thomas et al, 2006a,b,c), based on the Life Quality 
Index (Nathwani, 1997, Nathwani et al., 2009), allows an objective balance to be 
struck for the first time between what is spent on safety and the benefit that will be 
achieved.  The method has been validated against pan-national data on the revealed 
preferences of literally billions of people all over the world (Thomas and Waddington, 
2017, Thomas, 2017a).  It is this combination of objectivity and empirical validation 
that constitutes the J-value's unique attraction for conducting cost-benefit analyses to 
assess the correct level of spending to reduce a threat to human life.  It allows both 
balance and consistency to be extended to safety decisions where people may have 
less of an historic feel for the level of risk, as in the case of nuclear radiation. 
 If other socio-political factors are to alter public decisions away from the 
baseline provided by the J-value, these should set out explicitly and transparently to 
justify why the hazard in question should be treated differently from other risks of 
similar magnitude. 
 As noted in the Discussion (Section 7) of the Relocation Paper, precautionary, 
temporary evacuation might be a reasonable response while the extent of a reactor 
release was being established.  But the purpose of the Relocation Paper was to analyze 
the policy of evacuating members of the public for a long period or permanently after 
the accidents at Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi.  The J-value analysis of relocation 
was conservative, as it took no account of the psycho-social impact (known to be 
heavy), which would militate further against moving out large numbers of people long 
term.  Section 7 reviews evidence of likely damaging effects. 
 Kasperski et al. suggest in their second last paragraph that a chaotic response 
to a big nuclear accident is inevitable.  We have to disagree.  As noted in the 
Relocation Paper, the availability, in advance of any accident, of 
• "spatially distributed, real-time measurements of ground contamination (an 
innovation that modern technology could make viable)  
• "a prediction model for current and future dose such as the MIB [Moscow 
Institute of Biophysics] model  
• "a model to convert dose into loss of life expectancy such as CLEARE, and 
• "a J-value program to provide evolving J-value guidance  
"would allow decision makers to make sensible judgements on who should be 
evacuated on a temporary basis.  The number of people asked to leave their 
homes if only for a short time could then be minimised so as to keep disruption 
to a minimum."  
 
Detailed points 
Paragraph 2 of Kasperski et al.  Concerning radiological data, documents produced by 
the UN Standing Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR, 2015 
sets out its guiding principles), the Moscow Institute of Biophysics model and data 
from the European Commission report from Lochard and Schneider formed the basis 
for the J-value assessment of the 1
st
 Chernobyl relocation of 116,000 people  in 1986 
and the 2
nd
 relocation of 220,000 four years later.  Sensitivity studies were carried out, 
including the 95
th
 percentile case, where entire settlements would be evacuated if 5% 
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of the population merited relocation.  While there will, inevitably, be scope for 
inaccuracy in both the measurements and the model, confidence in the results is 
generated by the commonality in the overall conclusions coming from the other two, 
diverse approaches used in the NREFS project (Managing Nuclear Risk Issues, 
Environmental, Financial and Safety); these were optimal economic control 
(Yumashev et al., 2017) and PACE-COCO2 (Ashley et al., 2017). 
Paragraph 3.  The life quality index is proportional to the utility of earnings rather 
than to the earnings per se.  The chosen measure of average earnings, GDP per head, 
is an ethical choice that allows the next day of life for each person in the nation to be 
valued the same. 
Paragraph 4.  Contrary to the claim of Kasperski et al. that we "ignored the dosages 
received" and the "uncertainty of their distribution", the doses in each settlement were 
based on UNSCEAR documentation.  Moreover, detailed allowance was made for the 
distribution of dose within each township, as explained in Appendices A, B and C. 
Paragraph 5.  In promoting a wise choice of safety measures, the J-value method takes 
account of the resources available to those living within a nation.  This is how it is 
able to explain the shape of the Preston curve of life expectancy at birth versus GDP 
per head.  The Relocation Paper examined two nuclear accidents, one in the wealthy 
country of Japan (2011) and one in the USSR (1986), which, as Kasperski et al. point 
out, was not wealthy by world standards.  We presented full details of the J-value 
calculations in each case.  Meanwhile, in companion papers, Ashley et al. (2017) 
considered a hypothetical major accident at a generic, modern water-cooled reactor in 
the UK, while Yumashev et al. (2017) consider the effects of hundreds of notional 
severe accidents at reactors sited in diverse economies across the world. 
Paragraph 6.  As Kasperski et al. note, the effects of radiation on humans have been 
studied by the International Committee on Radiological Protection (ICRP) for the past 
90 years.  Members of the public living in the vicinity have faced low-level radiation 
exposure after the world's two big reactor accidents.  It is indeed a non-trivial task for 
the ICRP to separate out the effects of low-level radiation against the confounding 
background of life's other hazards.  But all the years of study mean that we are 
probably closer to a reasonable answer on the effects of radiation than for most other 
pollutants.  We would obviously reject firmly any imputation that the Relocation 
Paper might have recommended keeping people in place longer so as to enhance the 
gathering of radiological data. 
Paragraph 7.  It became possible in 1997 to make a first estimate of the likely number 
of childhood thyroid cancer victims caused by the Chernobyl accident (Thomas, 
1997).  Further epidemiological data to the end of 1998 allowed a better prediction 
(3300 – 7600) of the eventual number and the mean latency period, calculated as 17 
years with standard deviation of 10 years.  The large spread about the mean accounts 
for the fact that cases could start coming to light within 4 years of the accident 
(Thomas and Zwissler, 2003).  Exposure to 
131
I (half-life 8 days) and possibly other, 
shorter-lived iodine isotopes, is the most likely cause of the thyroid cancers observed, 
with a prior iodine deficiency in the area a further contributing factor.  The 
approximately 7,000 cancers recorded after Chernobyl, while undoubtedly of concern, 
are susceptible to medical treatment leading to full remission in about 98% of cases.  
Early use of prophylactic iodine is the established mitigation measure.  By contrast, 
relocation will be rather ineffective because it is inherently slow and unlikely to be 
completed until the radioactive iodine has decayed to negligible levels and the threat 
has subsided. 
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Paragraph 8.  This paragraph seems to reject scientific principles and the possibility of 
using a scientific model to calculate a future outcome.  We do not agree. 
Paragraphs 9 and 10.  The Relocation Paper reviewed the results of the Lochard and 
Schneider (1992) study as an important contribution to the prior literature.  But the J-
value method represents a significant theoretical and practical advance, as was 
emphasized in the comments in the relevant section 4.1 of the Relocation Paper that 
discussed the Lochard and Schneider work.  To be clear: the results of the Relocation 
Paper do not rely on the results of the analysis by Lochard and Schneider. 
Paragraphs 11 and 13.  The comments of Kasperski et al. on the health consequences 
of radiation exposure are similar to the concerns they expressed in their paragraph 6, 
to which we have responded above.  Their suggestion that the authors of the 
Relocation Paper have "chosen cost as their standard" is misleading.  The J-value 
balances life expectancy gained against the cost of the safety measure using an 
objective and empirically validated method.  The benefit is judged by reference to the 
satisfaction or utility that the people affected can expect to gain over the rest of their 
lives: overspending on safety will diminish people's utility.  
 The J-value, with its emphasis on life expectancy, can extend the way that 
people decide on life prolonging measures to those safety decisions where, for a 
variety of reasons including unfamiliarity with the hazard, people have less of an 
intuitive feel for the level of risk.  Nuclear radiation is an obvious example.  The fact 
that the J-value has been validated against empirical data (Thomas and Waddington, 
2017) increases confidence that the J-value will yield reasonable results.  It will also 
give consistency, irrespective of the industry concerned (nuclear, chemical, rail 
transport, health etc.).  Moreover the J-value can be argued to embody the principle of 
"reasonable achievement" in the sense that it identifies the amount of resource that 
people in the nation would normally want to devote to reducing a risk of the specified 
magnitude. 
Paragraph 12.  The paragraph seems inimical to the development and application of 
measurement science.  By contrast, we would contend that scientific instruments, no 
less in the field of radiation than in other fields, allow the acquisition and 
development of further knowledge that can help mankind. 
Paragraph 14.  The reactor at Chernobyl was contained during normal operation 
within individual pressure tubes inside a reinforced concrete cavity.  The severe 
accident it suffered caused this containment to be breached catastrophically, as 
explained.  No suggestion was made or implied that there was a reactor containment 
building at the Chernobyl nuclear power station comparable to that used in a Western-
designed Pressurized Water Reactor.  For fuller details see World Nuclear Association 
(2016 and 2018). 
Paragraph 15.  The Relocation Paper was concerned with applying the J-value to 
assess the relocation measures instituted after the world's two largest nuclear reactor 
accidents, which occurred at Chernobyl in 1986 and at Fukushima Daiichi in 2011.  
Kyshtym formed part of the Soviet Union's military rather than its civil nuclear 
programme; the accident was classified by the IAEA as less severe than those at 
Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi (Britannica, 2017).  The authorities did not 
recommend relocation after the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island (Stallings, 1984). 
Paragraph 17.  Despite recommending a policy of mass evacuation after every nuclear 
reactor accident, Kasperski et al. argue that such a course of action will always result 
in chaos.  By contrast, the Relocation Paper points to the provision and interpretation 
of better measurement data, provided in real time, as a way of ensuring orderly 
control of the post-accident situation.  Such information could be provided not only to 
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the incident controller but also to politicians, the media and the general public 
(Thomas, 2017b).  Regularly updated predictions could be provided for the loss of life 
expectancy resulting from living in the towns and villages in the vicinity of the 
nuclear plant for the next 70 years or more, figures likely to be reassuring in many 
cases.  For example, based on contamination data taken after fallout deposition had 
finished following the accident at Fukushima Daiichi, the average radiation-induced 
loss of life expectancy in Tomioka Town could be estimated as less than 3 months.  
Tomioka was, in fact, the worst affected settlement after the accident at Fukushima 
Daiichi. 
 We hope that these responses will promote a better appreciation of the paper's 
key message, shared with the other two, diverse methods applied in the NREFS 
project, which is that relocation of people following a big nuclear accident is a policy 
measure to be used sparingly if at all. 
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